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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the contribution of health related behaviors to the
education gradient, using an empirical approach that addresses the endogeneity
of both education and behaviors in the health production function. We apply
this approach to a multi-country data set, which includes 12 European countries
and has information on education, health and health behaviors for a sample
of individuals aged 50+. Focusing on self reported poor health as our health
outcome, we find that education has a protective role both for males and females.
When evaluated at the sample mean of the dependent variable, one additional
year of education reduces self-reported poor health by 7.1% for females and by
3.1% for males. Health behaviors - measured by smoking, drinking, exercising
and the body mass index - contribute to explaining the gradient. We find that
the effects of education on smoking, drinking, exercising and eating a proper
diet account for at most 23% to 45% of the entire effect of education on health,
depending on gender.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between education and health - the ”education gradient” - is widely
studied. There is abundant evidence that a gradient exists (Cutler and Lleras-Muney,
2010). Yet less is known as to why education might be related to health. In this
paper we explore the contribution of health related behaviors (shortly, behaviors) -
which we measure with smoking, drinking, exercising and having a poor diet - to
the education gradient. To do so, we decompose the gradient into two parts: a) the
part mediated by health behaviors; b) a residual, which includes for instance stress
reduction, better decision making, better information collection, healthier employment
and better neighborhoods (Lochner, 2011)1.
We are not the first to investigate the mediating role of health behaviors. As recently
pointed out by Lochner (2011), a problem with the existing empirical literature is
that most contributions fail to address the endogeneity of education and behaviors
in health regressions: there are possibly many confounding factors which influence
both education and behaviors, on the one hand, and health outcomes, on the other
hand. While some studies have dealt with endogenous education, our approach is novel
because we address the endogeneity of both education and behaviors in the health
production function, and therefore can give a causal interpretation to our estimates.
Our identification strategy - based on the work by Card and Rothstein (2007) -
allows us to estimate average education effects for an individual randomly picked from
the population. Using a cross-country dataset, where we have a rich set of parental
and early life information, this strategy combines selection on observables and fixed
effects assumptions to estimate the parameters of both a dynamic health equation,
which depends on education and lagged health behaviors, and a static health equation,
where health depends only on education. The effect of education on health in the
second equation is the education gradient (shortly, the gradient), i.e. the total effect of
education on health that results from both mediated and residual effects of education.
We compare the estimates of the gradient obtained following the strategy outlined
above with those obtained with a completely different methodology, instrumental vari-
ables (IV) estimation, where the key exogenous variation is provided by the changes
in compulsory school leaving ages across countries and birth cohorts. While the IV
strategy generates causal estimates that are internally valid for individuals affected by
mandatory schooling laws (compliers), it cannot be used for the decomposition of the
education gradient, because of the lack of valid and relevant instruments for behaviors.
We apply this approach to a multi-country data set, which includes 12 European
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
1The residual also includes the contribution of unmeasured behaviors.
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Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) and has information on education, health
and health behaviors for a sample of males and females aged 50+. By focusing on older
individuals, we consider the long term effects of education on health. These data are
drawn from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and
from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). Both surveys are modeled
following the US Health and Retirement Study.
Focusing on self-reported poor health as our health outcome, we find that education
has a protective role both for males and females, although effects for females are
typically somewhat higher. When evaluated at the sample mean of the dependent
variable, one additional year of education reduces self-reported poor health by 7.1%
for females and by 3.1% for males. These effects are smaller than those found by
others. Our explanation is that we use a sample of older individuals (50+) typically
done in the literature, and that the protective role of education on health declines with
age.
Our qualitative findings are robust to the choice of the identification strategy. The
absolute size of the gradient, however, is largest when we focus on the compliers to
compulsory school reforms. For this sub-group we find that, when evaluated at the
sample mean of the dependent variable, one additional year of education reduces self
perceived poor health by 16.5% and 12.1% for males and females respectively. Since
compliers are typically drawn among those with lower education, our findings suggest
that improving the education of this group is particularly rewarding in terms of better
self perceived health.
There is also evidence that health behaviors - measured by smoking, drinking, ex-
ercising and the body mass index - contribute to explaining the gradient. The size
of this contribution is larger when we consider the entire history of behaviors rather
than only behaviors in the immediate past. In the former case, we find that the effects
of education on smoking, drinking, exercising and eating a proper diet account for at
most 23% to 45% of the entire effect of education on health, depending on gender.
The largest part of the gradient, however, remains unaccounted for. Potential candi-
dates include direct effects of education on health as well as indirect effects operating
through unobserved health behaviors, wealth and cognitive abilities.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a brief review of the relevant lit-
erature. The theoretical model is presented in Section 3, and our empirical strategy
is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 describes the data. The empirical results are
discussed in Section 6. Conclusions follow.
3
2 Review of the Literature
As recently reviewed by Lochner (2011), the empirical research on the causal effect of
education on health has produced so far mixed results. This literature typically focuses
on the impact on self-reported health and on single countries (Clark and Royer (2010),
Juerges et al. (2009), Silles (2009), Adams (2002), Arendt (2005), Arendt (2008),
Albouy and Lequien (2009)) and identifies the effect of education on health by using
the exogenous variation generated by changes in mandatory schooling laws. Some of
these studies find that education improves self reported health (Mazumder (2008) for
the US and Silles (2009) for the UK). Others find no effect (Clark and Royer (2010),
Oreopolous (2007), Braakmann (2011) and Juerges et al. (2009) for the UK, Arendt
(2005) for Denmark). While Silles (2009) finds that education reduces self reported
long term illness in the UK, Kempter et al. (2011), find a protective role of education
for German males but not for German females2.
There are many possible channels through which education may improve health.
Lochner (2011) lists the following: stress reduction, better decision making and/or
better information gathering, higher likelihood of having health insurance, healthier
employment, better neighborhoods and peers and healthier behaviors.3 The contribu-
tion of behaviors, which include smoking, drinking and eating calorie-intensive food,
has been examined in the economic and sociological literature, starting with the con-
tribution by Ross and Wu (1995)4. These authors use US data, regress measures of
health on income, social resources and behaviors and treat both behaviors and educa-
tion as exogenous. They find that behaviors explain less than 10% of the education
gradient.
Cutler et al. (2008) discuss possible mechanisms underlying the education gradient.
Using data from the NHIS survey in the US, they find that behaviors account for over
40% of the effect of education on mortality in their sample of non-elderly Americans.
A problem with these studies is that they fail to consider the endogeneity of both ed-
ucation and behaviors in a health equation which includes both. In the study closest
to the current paper, Contoyannis and Jones (2004) partly address this concern by
explicitly modeling the optimal choice of health behaviors. They jointly estimate a
health equation - where health depends on education and behaviors - and separate
behavior equations - where behaviors depend on education - by FIML (Full Informa-
tion Maximum Likelihood), treating education as exogenous. Using Canadian data,
2While most studies consider self reported health, Powdthavee (2010), examines the effects of
education on hypertension, as determined from blood pressure measurements, Meghir et al. (2011)
study mortality in Sweden and Brunello et al. (2011) study the effects on several chronic diseases.
3Conti et al. (2010) argue that non-cognitive skills may be an important factor as well.
4See the reviews by Feinstein et al. (2006) and Cawley and Ruhm (2011).
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they show that the contribution of lagged (7 years earlier) behaviors to the education
gradient varies between 23% to 73%, depending on whether behaviors are treated as
exogenous or endogenous.
We summarize the existing evidence as follows: first, the available empirical evi-
dence on the causal effect of education on health is mixed at best and covers a rather
limited set of countries (US, UK, Canada, Germany, Denmark and France); second,
the estimated contribution of behaviors to the education gradient varies substantially
across the few available studies, depending on model specification and identification
strategy.5
We contribute to this literature in several directions. Our study is the first to cover
a substantial number of European countries (12), using a multi-country dataset which
includes also Southern European countries, which have not been studied before. We are
also the first to offer an identification strategy which addresses the endogeneity of both
education and health behaviors in the health production function. The estimates of
the education gradient based on this strategy are compared with those obtained with a
more conventional IV strategy, which uses the exogenous variation across countries and
cohorts induced by changes in mandatory school leaving age. Finally, we distinguish
explicitly between the short run and long run mediating effects of health behaviors.
While the former only include the effects of current or lagged behaviors, the latter takes
into account the contribution of the entire history of behaviors. This qualification is
empirically relevant as we show in section 6.
3 The Model
Following Grossman (1972), Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) and Contoyannis and
Jones (2004), assume that individuals have preference orderings over their own poor
health H and two bundles of goods, C and B, where only the latter affects health. The
vector B includes risky health behaviors or habits - such as smoking, the use of alcohol
or drugs, unprotected sex, excessive calorie intake and poor exercise - which increase
the utility from consumption but damage health6. Utility U(C,B,H) is concave in its
arguments and the marginal utility of consumption (UC and UB) varies with health
7.
Reflecting the view that better educated individuals have access to higher income and
5See also Stowasser et al. (2011) for a discussion on causality issues between socio-economic status
in general and health.
6See the discussion in Feinstein et al. (2006)
7The sub-scripts are for partial derivatives. The relationship between health and the marginal
utility of consumption is not clear ex-ante. On the one hand, the latter may decline with deteriorating
health, because several consumption goods are complements to good health. On the other hand,
deteriorating health may increase the marginal utility of consumption. ”. . . as other consumption
goods - such as prepared meals or assistance with self-care - are substitutes for health . . .”(Finkelstein
et al., 2008)
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can therefore extract higher utility from better health and a longer life, we assume that
the marginal utility of (poor) health declines when individual education E increases,
that is UHE < 0
8.
The stock of individual poor health H is positively affected by behaviors B and neg-
atively affected by individual education E. As reviewed by Lochner (2011), channels
through which education may improve health include stress reduction, better decision
making, healthier and safer employment, healthier neighborhoods and peers. Poor
health H depends also on a vector of unobservables µ, which include both parental
and job characteristics (see Park, 2008). Using a linear specification, the health pro-
duction function is given by
H = αB − βE + γµ (1)
Rational individuals maximize their utility with respect to consumption, subject to
the health production function and to the budget constraint, defined as follows9
pC +B = Y (E,X) (2)
where Y is income, which varies with education and a vector of observable controls
X, p is the vector of consumption prices for goods C and the prices of B are normal-
ized to 1. Assuming that an internal solution exists, the necessary conditions for a
maximum are
UC − λp = 0 (3)
UB + αUH − λ = 0 (4)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Concavity of the utility function implies UHH <
0. Moreover, Finkelstein et al. (2008), find that the marginal utility of consumption
declines when health deteriorates. Therefore, UCH < 0 and UBH < 0. By totally
differentiating (3) and (4) and using (1) we obtain that higher education reduces
health damaging behaviors if the following condition holds10
|UHE| > β
[
(
|UBH |
α
− |UCH |
pα
) + |UHH |)
]
(5)
8As argued by Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006), the higher weight placed on health by the better
educated could reflect the higher value of the future: ”...if education provides individuals with a better
future along several dimensions - people may be more likely to invest in protecting that future”. (p.15)
9Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983), and Contoyannis and Jones (2004), use a similar formulation.
10We assume that the second order conditions for a maximum hold. Condition (5) also ensures
that higher education increases consumption C. When utility is separable in consumption and health
- as in Cutler et al. (2003)
U(C,B,H) = U(C) + Ω(B)− h(E)H
condition (5) is verified if hE(E) > 0.
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The optimal consumption plan in implicit form is given by
C = C(E, p, µ,X) (6)
B = B(E, p, µ,X) (7)
Using (7) in (1) and in the utility function yields the ”reduced form”health equation
H = H(E, p, µ,X) (8)
and the indirect utility function V = V (E, p, µ,X). The marginal effect of education on
health in (8) is the ”education gradient” (HEG). Assuming that the cost of education
Γ(E,Z), where Z is a vector of cost of education shifters, is convex in the years of
education, optimal education is given by
VE(E, p, µ,X) = ΓE(E,Z) (9)
3.1 The Contribution of Health Behaviors to the Education
Gradient: Current or Lagged Behaviors
In the empirical literature (Ross and Wu (1995) or Cutler et al. (2008)) the contribution
of health behaviors to the education gradient is evaluated by using either current
of lagged behaviors in equation (1). The lag is often justified with the view that
the impact of health behaviors on health requires time. In this case, and omitting
unobservables µ for the sake of simplicity, the health production function (1) can be
re-written as
Ht = αBt−1 − βE (10)
where t is time, and the education gradient can be decomposed into: a) the effect
operating via health behaviors lagged once Bt−1; b) a residual effect. The ratio between
a) and the overall effect measures the relative contribution of health behaviors lagged
once to the education gradient.
To illustrate with an example, assume that utility is given by U(Ct, Bt, Ht) =
Φ(Ct) + Γ(Bt) − h(E)Ht and let ρ be the discount factor. Under these assumptions,
optimal behavior is Bt = B(E,Xt, pt, ρ). Ignoring for the time being the price vector
p, the discount factor and the vector X, a linear approximation of this behavior is
Bt = λ0 − λ1E (11)
Substituting (11) into (10) yields
Ht = αλ0 − (αλ1 + β1)E (12)
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The gradient is −(αλ1 + β1) and the relative contribution of behaviors lagged once to
the gradient is αλ1
(αλ1+β1)
.
3.2 The Contribution of Health Behaviors to the Education
Gradient: The History of Behaviors
By focusing on current or lagged behaviors, specification (10) explicitly assumes that
previous lags do not contribute to current health conditional on behaviors observed
in the previous period. To illustrate again with an example the implications of this
assumption, let the ”true” health production function be given by
Ht = k0 + k1Bt−1 + k2Bt−2 + ...+ kTBt−T − θE (13)
This function is more general than (10) because current health depends both on
behaviors lagged once and on previous lags from t−2 to the initial period T . Ignoring
again the price vector p, the discount factor and the vector X, a linear approximation
of optimal behaviors is given by Bt = σ0 − σ1E, combined with (13) yields
Ht = k0 + k1Bt−1 − [σ1(k2 + ...+ kT ) + θ]E (14)
When the health production function depends on risky health behaviors lagged 1 to
T , the contribution of behaviors lagged once to the education gradient is σ1k1
[σ1(k1+k2+...+kT )+θ]
,
where the denominator includes both the effect of education on health conditional on
behaviors θ and the mediating effects of behaviors from lag 1 to T . This contribu-
tion differs from the contribution of health behaviors lagged 1 to T , which is given by
σ1(k1+k2+...+kT )
[σ1(k1+k2+...+kT )+θ]
. If the parameters ki are positive, ignoring the contribution of higher
lags leads to under-estimating the overall mediating effect of risky health behaviors.
When the available data do not include information on behaviors from lag t − 2
to lag T , as it happens in our case, an alternative approach is to adopt the dynamic
health equation (see for instance Park and Kang (2008))
Ht = piBt−1 − νE + φHt−1 (15)
which requires data only for periods t and t − 1. Under the assumptions that
Ht−T = 0 and φ < 1, and ignoring again prices, the vector X and the discount factor,
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equation (15) is equivalent to equation (13) when the following restrictions on the
parameters hold
k1 = pi
θ = ν
1− φT
1− φ
k2 = piφ
kT = piφ
T−1 (16)
Since (15) can be written as (13)11, the linear approximation of optimal health
behaviors is unchanged. Using this approximation into (13), taking into account con-
straints (16) and assuming that T is large (φT −→ 0) we obtain
Ht = piBt−1 −
[
ν + φσ1pi
1− φ
]
E (17)
The education gradient - which includes also the mediating effect of health behaviors
lagged once - is equal to − (piσ1+ν)
1−φ . The relative contribution of health behaviors lagged
once to the education gradient (short-run mediating effect, SRME) is
SRME =
(1− φ)piσ1
(piσ1 + ν)
(18)
The overall relative contribution of health behaviors (long-run mediating effect,
LRME) to the education gradient adds to the contribution of health behaviors lagged
once the contribution of lags from t− 2 to T, and is equal to
LRME =
piσ1
(piσ1 + ν)
(19)
This implies that SRME = (1−φ)LRME. Under our assumptions, SRME under-
estimates LRME, and the degree of under-estimation is larger the higher is φ (per-
sistency of health status over time). Therefore, if we only estimate SRME, we may
find a small contribution of health behaviors to the overall education gradient not
because health behaviors have a small mediating effect but because we have ignored
the contributions of health behaviors lagged more than once12.
11This is the case when the unobservable component µ is either time invariant or follows an au-
toregressive process.
12If the education gradient is negative, sufficient conditions for the indicator LRME (SRME) to
fall within the range [0, 1] are piσ1 ≥ 0 and ν ≥ 0 (φpiσ1 + ν ≥ 0). If the gradient is positive, these
conditions also change sign.
9
3.3 Estimating the Short-Run and Long-Run Mediating Ef-
fects
One of the aims of this paper is to provide estimates of SRME and LRME. Our
empirical strategy consists of estimating the parameters of both the dynamic health
equation (15) and the ”reduced form” health equation
Ht = χo − χ1E (20)
where χ1 =
(piσ1+ν)
1−φ . Using these estimates, we can compute both
piσ1 = χ̂1(1− φ̂)− ν̂ (21)
and
L̂RME =
χ̂1(1− φ̂)− ν̂
χ̂1(1− φ̂)
(22)
ŜRME = (1− φ̂)L̂RME (23)
This strategy has the advantage that it only requires the estimation of two equations
and the drawback that we cannot separately identify the mediating effect of each single
health behavior. For that, we would need to estimate also Eq. (7) for each available
behavior. We leave this development to future research.
4 The Empirical Strategy
The dynamic health equation (1) includes education E, behaviors B and unobservables
µ. On the one hand, optimal behaviors depend on µ (see Eq. (7)). On the other
hand, optimal education equalizes the marginal costs and the marginal benefits of
education, and these benefits depend on µ. Therefore, individual choice implies that
both education and behaviors in Eq. (15) and education in the ”reduced form”equation
(20) are correlated with unobservables that affect health outcomes. Because of this,
ordinary least squares estimates of either equation fail to uncover causal relationships.
As remarked above, an important caveat for the empirical studies investigating the
mediating effect of health behaviors on the education gradient is that they fail to
consider these endogeneity problems (Lochner, 2011). In this paper, we address these
problems in an attempt to give a causal interpretation both to the health-education
gradient and to the mediating role of behaviors.
In the past few years, several papers have estimated the causal effect of education on
health using the exogenous variation in educational attainment generated by changes
in compulsory schooling. This instrumental variables (IV) approach can be used to
10
estimate the ”reduced” form health equation (20). In principle, the same approach can
also be applied to estimate the dynamic health production function (15), provided that
we can find additional credible sources of exogenous variation which affect risky health
behaviors without influencing individual health (conditional on behaviors). This is a
very difficult task with the data at hand.13 Therefore, we turn to the identification
strategy suggested by Card and Rothstein (2007), which combines aggregation, selec-
tion on observables and fixed effects assumptions, to estimate both the dynamic health
production function and the ”reduced form” health equation. For the latter equation,
we compare the results obtained following the Card and Rothstein (2007) approach
to those obtained with a more standard IV approach, using changes in compulsory
education as the relevant instrument. In the rest of this section, we illustrate the two
approaches in turn.
4.1 The Card-Rothstein approach
Consider the following empirical version of the dynamic health production function
Hicgbt = α0 + α1Bicgb(t−1) + α2Eicg + α3Xicgb + α4Hicgbt−1 + εicgbt (24)
where X is a vector of controls, B the vector of behaviors, ε is the error term, i denotes
the individual, c the country, t the year of the interview, g gender, and b is the birth
cohort.
Following Card and Rothstein (2007), we can decompose the error term in equation
(24) as follows
εicgbt = ucgbt + eicgbt (25)
where ucgbt represents a common error component for individuals of the same gender
g and birth cohort b in country c at time t, eicgbt is an individual specific idiosyncratic
error component for which we assume
E[eicgbt|b, g, c, t] = 0 (26)
i.e., the individual specific error term has mean zero across individuals of the same
gender, year of birth, country and time period.
13Using instruments like the price of alcohol or cigarettes has two main drawbacks. First, it would
exploit only cross-sectional variation across different countries: indeed, all such potential instruments
would influence all cohorts in one country alike. Second, it would prevent from the possibility to
control for country fixed effects.
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We aggregate individual data in cells identified by country, time, birth cohort and
gender, define G as a gender dummy equal to 1 for females and to 0 for males and
re-write Eq. (24) as follows
Hcbt = α0 + α
F
0 G+ α1Bcb(t−1) + α
F
1 GBcb(t−1) + α2Ecb + α
F
2 GEcb
+α3Xcb + α
F
3 GXcb + α4Hcbt−1 + α
F
4 GHcbt−1 + ucbt (27)
where the superscript F refers to females and we allow each explanatory variable to
have a gender-specific effect on health. Taking gender differences (∆ =females - males),
we obtain
∆Hcbt = α
F
0 + α1∆Bcb(t−1) + α
F
1 B
F
cb(t−1) + α2∆Ecb + α
F
2 E
F
cb + α3∆Xcb + α
F
3 X
F
cb+
+α4∆Hcbt−1 + αF4 H
F
cbt−1 + ∆ucbt (28)
In this specification, α1 and α1 +α
F
1 are the effects of health behaviors lagged once for
males and females respectively. Similarly, the gender gap in the ”returns” to education
is given by coefficient αF2 .
Differencing by gender eliminates all unobserved factors that are common to males
and females for a given country c, birth cohort b and time t, including genetic and envi-
ronmental effects, income components, medical inputs and the organization of health
care14. Even after eliminating common unobservables, however, the residual error
component ∆ucbt could still be correlated with education and lagged health behaviors.
This could happen, for instance, if health conditions and parental background during
childhood differ systematically by gender or if labor market discrimination affects in-
dividual income and access to health care, conditional on educational attainment. To
remove this correlation, we model this residual as
∆ucbt = ψb + ψc + ψt + ψ1∆Zcbt + ψ2Z
F
cbt + ψ3∆Ycbt + ψ4Y
F
cbt + vcbt (29)
where ψb, ψc and ψt are cohort, country and year of survey dummies, Y is real in-
come and Z is a vector of observables, which includes a rich set of parental background
characteristics and health conditions during childhood15. Our identifying assumption
is that, conditional on these variables which capture gender-specific genetic and en-
14See Zweifel and Breyer (1997).
15There is a growing literature on the impact of childhood health on adult economic outcomes
(Banks et al. (2011) or Smith (2009)). The vector Z includes: childhood poor health, hospitalization
during childhood, presence of serious diseases, had at most 10 books at home at age 10, mother and
father in the house at age 10, mother or father died during childhood, number of rooms in the house
at age 10, had hot water in the house at age 10, parents drunk or had mental problems at 10, had
serious diseases at age 15, born in the country, had proxy interview.
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vironmental effects, the error term vcbt is orthogonal to levels and changes in health
behaviors and educational attainment.
For the sake of brevity, we call this method ADS (aggregation cum differentiation
cum selection on observables). To illustrate, suppose that the key unobservable in
(24) is the latent (cell) average ability. The ADS method assumes that part of this
latent factor is common across genders and can be differenced out. The residual gender
specific component is captured by cohort and country dummies as well as by gender
differences in parental background at age 10 and initial health conditions. Conditional
on our identification assumption, Eq. (28) is estimated by weighted least squares, using
as weight
(
1
NM
+ 1
NF
)−1
, where NM and NF are the number of males and females in
each cell, as suggested by Card and Rothstein (2007).
4.2 IV estimates
It is useful to re-write the ”reduced form” health equation (20) as follows
Hit = ω1 + ω2Ei + ω3Xit + υit (30)
where i is for the individual, υ is the error term and Cov(E, υ) 6= 0. We estimate (30)
by instrumental variables, using as instrument for endogenous education the number
of years of compulsory education Y C. This is widely considered to be a credible
identification strategy, and one that has been extensively used in this and related
studies (see Lochner (2011) for a review). We apply this strategy to a multi-country
setup, as in Brunello, Fort and Weber (2009), and Brunello, Fabbri and Fort (2009),
Fort et al. (2011) and exploit the fact that school reforms have occurred at different
points in time in several countries16.
For each country and reform included in our sample, we construct pre-treatment and
post-treatment samples by identifying for each reform the pivotal birth cohort, defined
as the first cohort potentially affected by the change in mandatory school leaving age.
We include in the pre- and post-treatment samples all individuals born either before,
at the same time or after the pivotal cohort. By construction, the number of years
of compulsory education Y C “jumps” with the pivotal cohort and remains at the new
level in the post-treatment sample. The timing and intensity of these jumps varies
16We implement this strategy by selecting 7 countries where the individuals in our sample ex-
perienced at least one compulsory school reform: Austria, Denmark, England, France, Italy, the
Netherlands and the Czech Republic. The inclusion of the latter country is possible because the IV
approach does not require two waves per country. We exclude instead Germany and Sweden because
school reforms in these countries were implemented at the regional level and our information on the
region where the individual completed her education is not accurate. See Appendix B for a short
description of the compulsory school reforms used in this paper.
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across countries, and we use the within and across country exogenous variation in the
instrument to identify the causal effects of schooling on health.
The vector X in Eq. (30) includes country fixed effects, cohort fixed effects and
country-specific linear or quadratic trends in birth cohorts. These trends account for
country-specific improvements in health that are independent of educational attain-
ment17. Country fixed effects control for national differences both in reporting styles
and in institutions affecting health. Notice that the older cohorts in our data are
healthier than average, having survived until relatively old age. Since the comparison
of positively selected pre-treatment individuals with younger post-treatment samples
is likely to result in a downward bias in the estimates, we control for this selection
process by including cohort fixed effects.
5 Data
The estimation of the ”reduced form” and the dynamic health equation requires data
on health outcomes, risky health behaviors, education, parental background and early
socio-economic and health conditions. The European Survey of Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA)
and their retrospective interviews, satisfy these requirements. SHARE is a longitudinal
dataset on the health, socio-economic status and social relations of European individ-
uals aged 50+, and consists of two waves - 2004/5 and 2006/7 - plus a retrospective
wave in 2008/9 (SHARELIFE), covering several European countries - Austria, Bel-
gium, Switzerland, Denmark, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, The Netherlands
and Sweden18. ELSA has similar characteristics and covers England19. Since educa-
tion is typically accumulated in one’s teens or twenties, by focusing on individuals
aged 50+ we are considering the long run effects of education on health.
The measure of health used in this paper is self-reported poor health (SRPH), a
dummy equal to 1 if the individual considers her health as fair or poor and to 0 if she
considers it as good, very good and excellent. This is a subjective and comprehensive
measure of health, which is conventionally used in the applied literature (Lochner,
2011). One may object that self reported information is likely to be dominated by
noise and to fail to capture differences in more objective measures of health.20 This
17”Failure to account for secular improvements in health may incorrectly attribute those changes
to school reforms, biasing estimates toward finding health benefits of schooling..” (Lochner (2011),
p.41)
18The Czech Republic, Poland, Israel and Ireland joined in the second wave.
19For England, we use waves 2 (2004/5) and 3 (2006/7).
20For an early discussion about the importance of measurement error in self-reported health see
Bound (1991) and Butler et al. (1987) as well as Baker et al. (2004). These authors were primarily
concerned with the impact of measurement error in equations determining the impact of health
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is not the case here: among the individuals in the sample who reported poor health,
46% had hypertension, 69% had cardiovascular diseases and 79% suffered some long
term illness. On average, they had 2.44 chronic diseases (certified by doctors). In
contrast, the percentage of individuals in good health with similar diseases was 28,
44 and 33 percent, respectively.21 Moreover, the latter group experienced only 1.10
chronic diseases. While our data contain information on chronic diseases, which can
be argued to be more objective than self-reported health, we have chosen to focus on
the latter in order to be able to compare our results with the bulk of estimates in the
relevant literature. However, we also present in the robustness section of this paper
some estimates based on the number of chronic diseases22.
We measure educational attainment with years of education. The second wave of
SHARE provides information on the number of years spent in full time education. In
the first wave, however, participants were only asked about their educational quali-
fications. Thus, for the individuals participating only to the first wave, we calculate
their years of schooling using country-specific conversion tables. In ELSA, years of ed-
ucation are computed as the difference between the age when full-time education was
completed and the age when education was started. We have four measures of risky
health behaviors: whether the individual is currently smoking, whether she drinks
alcohol almost every day, whether she refrains from vigourous activity and the body
mass index (BMI). These risk behaviors are among the seven listed by the World
Health Organization as the most important factors affecting individual health - the
remaining three being low fruit and vegetable intake, illicit drugs and unsafe sex.
Table 1 reports the country averages of the health outcome SRPH, years of edu-
cation and annual income (thousand euro at 2005 prices, PPP) in 2006, as well as the
means of the four health behaviors (in 2004), separately by gender. There is important
cross-country and cross-gender variation, both in the outcome and in health behav-
iors. As expected, both income and years of education are higher among males aged
50+ than among females of the same age group. The percentage of females reporting
poorer health is higher than the percentage of males (32 versus 27 percent). Females
are less likely to smoke and drink than males. They have a slightly lower body mass
index (26.7 versus 27.1) and tend to exercise vigorously more often then males.
Table A-1 in the Appendix reports the country averages of the parental background
variables included in the vector Z. The table shows that there is important varia-
on retirement and other labor market outcomes; justification bias, i.e. non-working persons over-
reporting specific conditions is an obvious problem there.
21Heiss (2011) finds strong autocorrelation in self-reported health across waves and a strong corre-
lation with future mortality for the HRS.
22Using the same dataset, we discuss at length how the education gradient varies with different
measures of health in a companion paper (Brunello et al., 2011)
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tion both across countries and by gender. For instance, the percentage of individuals
with less than 10 books in the house at age 10 ranges from 79% in Italy to 18% in
Sweden. The gender gap is particularly relevant in England, where this percentage is
30% for males and 24% for females. Furthermore, the percentage of individuals who
was in poor health at age 10 was 9% among Spanish males and 11% among Spanish
females. There is less variation between genders in the parental background and hous-
ing characteristics: we interpret this as suggestive evidence that parental background
characteristics are substantially removed by gender differencing, since within country
and cohort they are largely common between males and females, on average.
The estimate of the dynamic health equation (15) requires information on the cur-
rent and the previous period. The two waves of SHARE and ELSA used in this paper
include both individuals who appear in both waves and individuals who are inter-
viewed only in a single wave. We compute cell averages at time t and t − 1 by using
all individuals rather than the longitudinal subsample. Each cell is defined by gender,
country, wave and semester of birth. We use semesters rather than years to increase
the number of available cells in the estimation23, and retain those cells that include at
least two observations.
6 Results
6.1 Baseline Estimates of the Reduced Form and Dynamic
Health Equations
As reviewed in Section 2, most earlier contributions to this literature fail to consider
the endogeneity of education and health behaviors in their health regressions. For
the sake of comparison, we start the illustration of our empirical findings with the
estimates of the ”reduced form” and dynamic health equations based on micro data.
We use a linear probability model and regress self-reported poor health on years of
education and a vector of variables, which varies according to whether we consider the
”reduced form” or the dynamic health equation but always includes parental and early
life controls.
For each regression, we pool males and females but allow for the full set of in-
teractions of each explanatory variable with a gender dummy. Preliminary testing
suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that cohort, country, time and early
life effects do not vary by gender24. We therefore report in Table 2 the results of a
more parsimonious specification, which includes a country-specific quadratic trend in
23Since we do not have information on the month of birth for England, we aggregate by year of
birth for this country.
24The joint hypothesis is not rejected at the 5 percent level of confidence (p-value: 0.094). We tested
separately also the null that the following effects are common between genders: cohort effect (p-value:
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the year of birth as well as common cohort, country, year of the survey and early life
controls. The table is organized in two columns, one for the ”reduced” form equation
and the other for the dynamic health equation, which includes health behaviors lagged
once, the first lag of health and current income.
Considering first the ”reduced form”equation, we find that the marginal effect of one
additional year of schooling is equal to −0.012 for males and to −0.017 for females25,
a relatively small effect when compared to the existing literature for Europe, which
points to an effect in the range −0.026 to −0.081 (Lochner (2011), Table 6). This
difference could be explained, at least in part, if the education gradient declines with
age, given that our sample consists of individuals aged 50+ and the samples used
in the literature typically include also younger individuals. Coefficients for parental
and early life conditions, including health at age 10, are statistically significant and
point in the expected direction: poor health conditions at 10 or 15 as well as poor
parental environments at early ages increase self perceived poor health at age 50+.
Importantly, the inclusion of these variables reduces the education gradient by 15 to
20 percent26, which suggests that they capture at least in part the positive correlation
between educational attainment and unobserved individual effects such as ability and
initial health.
Turning to the dynamic health equation, we find that our measures of risky health
behaviors have statistically significant coefficients, with predictable effects: smoking,
refraining from vigourous activity and poor diet leading to higher BMI increase self-
perceived poor health. Somewhat unexpectedly, however, drinking alcohol almost
every day reduces self-reported poor health. Annual real income also reduces perceived
poor health, which exhibits important persistence over time - the lagged dependent
variable has a coefficient close to 0.5 but statistically distinct from 1.
Adding health behaviors, income and lagged health reduces the marginal impact
of education on health from −0.012 to −0.005 for males, and from −0.017 to −0.006
for females. Assuming that the returns to education for the sample of countries under
study is equal to 0.0727, the estimated mediating effect of behaviors lagged once is
0.894), country effect (p-value: 0.42), background variables (p-value: 0.263), trends (p-value: 0.112)
and we never reject the null at conventional significance levels.
25The corresponding semi-elasticities evaluated at the average value of the dependent variable are
−4.5% for males and −5.2% for females. The higher gradient for females could be due to decreasing
returns to education, and to the fact that females in our sample are less educated than males. To
investigate this point further, we have added to the baseline specification a quadratic term in education
but found that it is not statistically significant.
26When we exclude parental and early life conditions, the gradient increases in absolute value to
0.016 for males and to 0.020 for females.
27See for instance the estimates in Brunello, Fort and Weber (2009). Including income in Eq. (15)
implies that LRME is equal to piσ1
(piσ1+ν+kρY )
, where k is the coefficient of income in the dynamic
health equation, ρ is the estimated return to education and Y is average income.
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9.7% for males and 16.8% for females. In the long run, when we include the effect of
earlier health behaviors, the mediating effect almost doubles, to 18.9% for males and
32.3% for females, suggesting that considering only their first lag may substantially
under-estimate the contribution of health behaviors to the education gradient. Our
estimated long run effects are smaller than those found by Cutler et al. (2008), who
use a different approach but conclude that measured health behaviors account for over
40% of the education gradient (on mortality) in a sample of non-elderly Americans28.
Although the inclusion of parental and early life controls in our regression is likely
to attenuate the correlation between education, health behaviors and unobservables,
there is no guarantee that this correlation will disappear entirely. In order to reduce
it further, we apply the ADS procedure discussed in Section 4.1, which combines
aggregation and gender differentiation with selection on observables. The specification
tests carried out in the micro data suggest that cohort, country, year and early life
effects do not differ significantly by gender. Note that while the value of the cohort,
country and year dummies is also common between gender within country and cohorts,
the average value of early life variables may differ between genders for a given country
and cohort. As a consequence, when we take gender differences of cell data, these
common effects are removed together with common unobservables. Therefore, our
preferred specification of the ADS model includes only differences of early life variables
and excludes both country and cohort dummies.29
Our results for the ADS model are shown on the right-hand side of Table 2, both
for the ”reduced form” and for the dynamic health equation. When we consider the
former, we find that the overall effect of education on health is negative and larger
in absolute values for females (−0.026) than for males (−0.010). Parental and early
life variables are jointly statistically significant (p-value: 0.009), mainly because of the
gender differences in poor health at age 10. Turning to the dynamic health equation,
we find that the effect of education conditional on behaviors is much smaller (−0.015
for females and −0.003 for males). While the precision of the estimates of the effects
of behaviors declines with respect to the micro data, we cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis that these effects are jointly statistically significant. Finally, income effects are
insignificant and the persistence of self-reported poor health over time is substantially
reduced with respect to the estimates based on micro-data.
28These authors estimate a static health equation, which includes income and occupation among
the explanatory variables, and use the following measures of health behaviors: current smoker, ever
smoker, number of cigarettes per day, obesity, regular exercise and use of seat belts always.
29We also run a less parsimonious specification of the ADS model that included cohort and country
dummies and tested whether they could be excluded from the model: the null of no cohort and
country dummies is never rejected at all conventional level of significance.
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Aggregation and differentiation increases the absolute value of the overall education
gradient for females from 0.017 to 0.026 but has limited effects on the gradient for
males, which marginally declines in absolute value from 0.012 to 0.010. The short
and the long run mediating effects of health behaviors are also affected. As shown
in Table 4, when compared to the micro-estimates the long run mediating effect for
males declines in absolute value (from 0.007 to 0.004) but increases as a share of the
gradient (from 18.9 to 44.5%). The opposite happens for females, for whom this effect
increases in absolute value from 0.005 to 0.006 but declines as share of the gradient
(from 32.3% to 22.8%).
In sum, when we explicitly take into account the endogeneity of education and
health behaviors, we find that the mediating effect of the latter ranges between 23
and 45% of the total education gradient. While the effect of education on behaviors
does contribute to account for an important share of the gradient, much remains to
be explained, either by the role played by unmeasured behaviors or by effects that
do not involve behaviors, such as better decision making, stress reduction and more
health-conscious peers.
6.2 IV Estimates of the Reduced Form Health Equation
In this section, we present the results of our instrumental variables strategy and com-
pare the estimated causal effects of education on health with those obtained from the
ADS identification strategy. Our instrument for education is the number of years of
compulsory education, which varies across countries and cohorts because of compul-
sory schooling reforms. For each country, we construct a sample of treated individuals,
who have experienced a change in compulsory education, and a control sample, with
no change in compulsory schooling. Since our data include only individuals aged 50+,
we need to focus on school reforms which took place between the 1940s and the 1960s,
and to restrict our attention to a sub-sample of 7 countries affected by these reforms.
Table 4 shows the selected countries, the years and the content of the reforms as well
as the pivotal cohorts, i.e. the first cohorts potentially affected by the reforms (see
Appendix B for a short description of the education reforms used in this paper).30
In order to ensure that individuals spent their schooling in their host country, we
restrict our sample to individuals aged 50 and above at the time of the interview, who
participated in the first or second wave of SHARE (second or third wave in ELSA), and
were born in the country or migrated there before age 5. Additionally, we control for
30We exclude Germany and Sweden because in these countries compulsory schooling laws were
implemented gradually across states or municipalities and we cannot identify for the individuals in
the sample where their education took place. We use instead data for the Czech Republic (only one
wave available), because for the IV-setup we do not need two time periods/waves as in the ADS
model.
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country fixed effects, cohort fixed effects as well as for some individual characteristics
(whether the individual is foreign-born, whether there was a proxy respondent for
the interview or proxy information is missing and indicators for interview-year). We
capture smooth trends in education and health by using country-specific polynomials
in cohorts. In particular, we estimate two specifications, one with a linear trend and
one with a quadratic trend.
Since the key identifying assumption that changes in individual education can be
fully attributed to the reforms is more plausible when the window around the pivotal
cohort is small, we estimate our model using two alternative samples, one including
individuals who were born up to 10 years before and after the reforms and another
where the relevant window is +7,-7. The two samples consist of 15,960 and 12,294
individuals respectively. Table 5 shows the summary statistics by country for the
larger sample.
Table 6 shows our estimates of the health-education gradient for both males and fe-
males. We report the OLS, 2SLS, ITT (Intention-To-Treat), first stage and IV-Probit
estimates for both samples, using two alternative specifications for the country-specific
trends (linear or quadratic). The OLS estimate of the gradient is equal to −0.017 for
males and to −0.025 for females. When instrumenting years of education with years
of mandatory schooling, the magnitude of the coefficients increase somewhat. One ad-
ditional year of schooling decreases the probability of poor health by 4-8 percentage-
points for females and 5-6 percentage-points for males. IV-Probit estimations yield
very similar results. The instrumentation strategy works well, our first-stage regres-
sions show that instruments are relevant and not weak (F-Statistics of 13-41): one
additional year of compulsory schooling is increasing actual schooling by a quarter
to a third of a year. These estimates are comparable with those previously found
in the literature using similar identification strategies and represents a plausible re-
action, because a compulsory schooling reform should primarily only be effective for
individuals who would not have continued schooling in the absence of the reform. We
interpret these effects as Local Average Treatment Effects, i.e. the impact of school-
ing on health for those individuals who were actually affected by the reforms. These
individuals typically belong to the lower portion of the education distribution.
6.3 IV and ADS Results Compared
Next, we compare the estimated health-education gradient obtained from the IV-
approach with the corresponding estimate in the ADS model (Table 7). For the IV-
estimates, we report the ones obtained with the linear trend specification for Sample
10. Education decreases self-perceived poor health by 4 and 4.8 percentage points
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for females and males respectively. The ADS model yields fairly similar estimates for
females (2.6 percentage points), but smaller ones for males (1 percentage point).
Since the IV approach and the ADS-model are based on a different set of coun-
tries and cohorts, we re-run the ADS model for the same sample we have used in the
IV-approach. The results are shown in the last column of Table 7. The magnitudes in-
crease somewhat to 2.8 percentage points for females and to 2 for males. As mentioned
above, while the IV estimates are Local Average Treatment Effects, i.e. the causal ef-
fects of education on health for the individuals affected by the compulsory schooling
reforms, the estimates obtained form the ADS method pertain to a randomly drawn
individual from the entire sample. If the protective effect of education on health is
more pronounced for persons with lower education, this could explain the somewhat
higher magnitudes in the case of the IV approach.
6.4 Robustness Checks
In this sub-section, we discuss several robustness checks. We start by collapsing data
by gender, country and year rather than semester of birth. By doing so, we reduce the
sample size by almost a half 31. As shown in the first two columns of Table 8, the effect
of education on health is virtually unaffected for females but declines for males. Next,
we omit England to take into account that English data are drawn from a different
(although quite similar) survey and can only be collapsed by year of birth. The second
two columns of Table 8 show that the education gradient changes only marginally.
However, when we decompose the gradient into the effect mediated by behaviors and
the residual effect, we find that LRME in this sub-sample is much smaller than in
the full sample, and equal to 8.5% and 11.1% of the gradient for females and males
respectively32.
Furthermore, we notice that the older cohorts in our data are strongly selected by
mortality patterns33. To control for this, we add to the regressions the level and the
gender difference of life expectancy at birth; these variables vary by country, gender
and birth cohort. Since these data are not available for Greece34, we are forced to omit
that country from the sample. As displayed by the last two columns in the Table, life
31Recall that for England we do not observe the month of birth. Therefore, cells for England are
always aggregated by year of birth.
32We have also estimated our equations on two sub-samples of countries, based on their proximity
to the Mediterranean Sea, but cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are not
statistically different.
33Age in our sample ranges from 50 to 86.
34We use data on life expectancy at birth from the Human Mortality & Human Life-Table
Databases. The databases are provided by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research
(www.demogr.mpg.de). The data are missing for some cohorts and for Greece. We use period
measures of life expectancy at birth since cohort measures are not available for all the cohorts we
considered in the study.
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expectancy is never statistically significant in the ”reduced form” health equation, and
only marginally significant (at the 10% level of confidence) in the dynamic health
equation. We conclude that adding this variable does little to our empirical estimates.
We also run our estimates for the sub-sample of individuals aged 50 to 69 and find
that one additional year of schooling reduces self-reported poor health by 11.5% for
males and by 22.4% for females. These percentages are closer to those found in the
empirical literature. Since survivors aged 70 to 86 are typically both better educated
and with a stronger protective role of education on health than the average individual
in the same age group; i.e. they will have a higher health-education gradient, it is
unlikely that the decline of the gradient with age is driven by selection effects. One
may think of several alternative reasons for such a decline. For instance, the gradient
can fade because cognitive abilities decline with age. On the other hand, the effect of
behaviors on health accumulates over time, which increases the gradient. At the same
time, one may speculate that differences by education increase with age because the
older care more about their health. Our empirical results suggest that the balance of
these effects is tilted in favor of the first.
Finally, we consider an alternative and more objective measure of health outcome,
the number of chronic diseases. While this number is reported by the interviewed
individuals, it is conditional on screening, i.e. each condition must have been detected
by a doctor. Table 9 presents both the ADS estimates of the ”reduced form” and
the dynamic health equation, and the IV estimates of the ”reduced form”. Using the
ADS method, we find evidence of a negative and statistically significant gradient for
females (−0.057) and of a positive, small and imprecisely estimated gradient for males
(0.012). The direction of these effects is confirmed but their size in absolute value is
larger (−0.157 for females and 0.080 for males) when we apply the IV method to the
sub-sample of 7 countries.
Defining P (D) as the probability of reporting a condition, this probability is the
product of the probability of undergoing screening P (S) and the probability of having
a condition conditional on screening, P (D|S). We speculate that in the case of males
the positive effect of education on the number of diseases is driven by the fact that
better educated males choose more intensive screening. Turning to the decomposition
of the gradient into the mediating effect of behaviors and the residual effect, we find
that SRME and LRME for females are equal to 16.5 and 28.1 percent respectively,
not far from the effects estimated for self reported poor health. In the case of males,
the estimated parameters do not meet the conditions for both SRME and LRME to
be well defined within the range [0, 1].
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7 Conclusions
We propose a strategy to estimate and decompose the health-education gradient which
takes into account both the endogeneity of educational attainment as well as the
endogenous choice of health behaviors. Our results show that one additional year of
schooling reduces self-reported poor health by 7.1% for females and by 3.1% for males.
Health behaviors - measured by smoking, drinking, exercising and the body mass index
- contribute to explaining this gradient. We find that the mediating effect of behaviors
accounts for at most 23% to 45% of the entire effect of education on health, depending
on gender. Using a completely different strategy - instrumental variables estimation -
we find corroborating results for the health-education gradient.
Since the gradient is key to understanding inequality in health and life expectancy
and is also used to assess overall returns to education (Lochner, 2011), it is important
to understand the mechanisms governing it. Many of the discussed health behaviors
are individual consumption decisions, changes thereof come at personal costs; e.g.
abstaining from smoking or drinking good wine. Increases in health achieved by such
costly changes in behavior have, thus, to be distinguished from changes resulting from
free benefits of education, such as lower stress, better decision making, etc. Moreover,
it is relevant for political decisions about subsidizing schooling. If individuals are aware
of the health-fostering effects of schooling and these are private, then there is no room
for public policy. If individuals are unaware of these benefits, the case for public policy
is stronger if health benefits of schooling are primarily free rather than being based on
costly health behavior decisions of individuals (Lochner, 2011).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, baseline estimation sample (micro-data), males (M)
and females (F).
Country Self-rep poor health Education Income Age Obs
M F M F M F M F M F
Austria 0.27 0.31 11.04 9.47 18.74 10.74 65.14 66.18 260 364
Belgium 0.24 0.29 12.36 11.55 16.09 10.82 65.24 65.59 905 1044
Denmark 0.21 0.26 11.25 10.98 16.34 13.02 64.57 65.68 385 399
England 0.28 0.29 11.26 11.20 20.67 14.25 67.50 67.35 1673 2050
France 0.32 0.38 12.17 11.29 23.53 14.04 65.36 66.35 486 638
Germany 0.29 0.35 13.58 12.23 24.50 8.57 65.23 63.69 310 342
Greece 0.19 0.25 9.49 8.16 14.95 6.90 65.10 64.78 717 801
Italy 0.38 0.50 8.08 7.11 13.07 6.55 66.42 65.16 602 722
Netherlands 0.26 0.29 11.88 11.23 22.92 11.29 65.33 64.66 526 599
Spain 0.39 0.52 7.99 7.50 13.65 5.52 67.30 66.44 364 458
Sweden 0.22 0.26 11.42 11.61 16.81 13.00 65.94 65.38 512 615
Switzerland 0.12 0.18 12.25 10.68 29.89 14.10 66.01 64.85 197 232
All 0.27 0.32 11.02 10.37 18.66 11.17 66.03 65.86 6937 8264
Country Smoking−1 Drinking−1 No vigorous exercise−1 BMI−1
M F M F M F M F
Austria 0.21 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.64 0.73 27.46 26.94
Belgium 0.37 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.61 0.75 26.95 26.06
Denmark 0.37 0.20 0.31 0.28 0.48 0.52 26.49 25.57
England 0.22 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.75 0.81 27.81 28.15
France 0.52 0.24 0.19 0.09 0.59 0.73 26.57 25.74
Germany 0.26 0.11 0.21 0.14 0.44 0.43 26.83 26.04
Greece 0.18 0.03 0.36 0.20 0.60 0.67 27.11 26.73
Italy 0.60 0.29 0.25 0.14 0.65 0.74 27.11 26.56
Netherlands 0.38 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.52 0.54 26.26 26.17
Spain 0.45 0.11 0.29 0.10 0.63 0.74 27.62 27.98
Sweden 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.20 0.48 0.60 26.55 25.53
Switzerland 0.34 0.19 0.24 0.19 0.48 0.57 25.78 24.76
All 0.32 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.61 0.70 27.07 26.72
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Table 2: Baseline Results - Micro and ADS Model
Micro-estimates ADS-model
Reduced form Dynamic HE Reduced form Dynamic HE
Females
education -0.017 -0.006 -0.026 -0.015
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
self-rep poor healtht−1 0.479 0.246
(0.012)*** (0.046)***
drinkingt−1 -0.025 -0.013
(0.012)** (0.053)
smokingt−1 0.052 -0.034
(0.012)*** (0.056)
No vigorous 0.032 0.040
exerciset−1 (0.009)*** (0.042)
BMIt−1 0.007 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.004)
incomet -0.000 -0.002
(0.000)** (0.001)
Males
education -0.012 -0.005 -0.010 -0.003
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)* (0.005)
self-rep poor healtht−1 0.486 0.308
(0.014)*** (0.046)***
drinkingt−1 -0.041 -0.062
(0.010)*** (0.038)
smokingt−1 0.030 0.043
(0.011)*** (0.042)
No vigorous 0.049 0.089
exerciset−1 (0.009)*** (0.041)**
BMIt−1 0.006 0.011
(0.001)*** (0.005)**
incomet -0.000 -0.001
(0.000)** (0.001)
Early life
few books in HH 0.043 0.022 0.053 0.040
(0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.035) (0.033)
serious diseases at 15 0.017 0.004 0.028 0.004
(0.008)** (0.007) (0.036) (0.035)
poor health at 10 0.117 0.062 0.158 0.135
(0.014)*** (0.012)*** (0.052)*** (0.049)***
hospital at 10 0.032 0.025 0.004 0.042
(0.016)** (0.014)* (0.063) (0.061)
Principal components
parents drink or have 0.036 0.018 0.011 0.025
mental problems at 10 (0.009)*** (0.008)** (0.039) (0.038)
parental absence at 10 0.011 0.007 -0.008 -0.009
(0.011) (0.009) (0.039) (0.037)
poor housing at 10 0.016 0.013 0.023 0.014
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.017) (0.016)
Cohort effects yes yes no no
Country-spec trends yes yes no no
Observations 15,201 15,201 736 734
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent
level.
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Table 3: Decomposition - Micro and ADS Model
Females Males
Micro-model ADS-model Micro-model ADS-model
Health-Education Gradient (HEG) -0.017 -0.026 -0.012 -0.010
- behaviors (short-term) -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
- behaviors (long-term) -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004
- residual (direct effect) -0.012 -0.020 -0.010 -0.006
Mediating effect as fraction of HEG
- SRME (short-term) 0.168 0.172 0.097 0.308
- LRME (long-term) 0.323 0.228 0.189 0.445
Notes: Computations based on the estimates reported in Table 2.
Table 4: Compulsory schooling reforms in Europe
Country Reform Schooling Pivotal Cohort
Austria 1962/66 8 to 9 1951
Czech Republic 1948 8 to 9 1934
1953 9 to 8 1939
1960 8 to 9 1947
Denmark 1958 4 to 7 1947
England 1947 9 to 10 1933
France 1959/67 8 to 10 1953
Italy 1963 5 to 8 1949
Netherlands 1942 7 to 8 1929
1947 8 to 7 1933
1950 7 to 9 1936
Table 5: Summary Statistics IV - Sample 10
Country Self-rep poor health Education Compulsory Edu Age Obs
Austria 0.233 11.363 8.237 58.971 782
Czech Republic 0.418 12.026 8.535 63.304 2,452
Denmark 0.208 11.802 5.642 59.194 1,898
England 0.373 10.713 9.585 72.355 4,672
France 0.331 11.324 8.275 63.668 2,223
Italy 0.337 8.822 6.032 59.631 2,093
Netherlands 0.338 10.613 8.263 69.95 1,840
All 0.339 10.901 8.088 65.588 15,960
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Table 6: Health-Education Gradient - IV approach
Sample 10 Sample 7
lin-trend qu-trend lin-trend qu-trend
Females
OLS -0.024 -0.024 -0.025 -0.025
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
2SLS -0.040 -0.064 -0.041 -0.085
(0.024)* (0.034)* (0.035) (0.032)***
ITT -0.014 -0.017 -0.011 -0.023
(0.008)* (0.008)** (0.009) (0.008)***
First Stage 0.344 0.253 0.263 0.271
(0.053)*** (0.058)*** (0.053)*** (0.058)***
IV-Probit -0.042 -0.057 -0.041 -0.073
(0.022)* (0.025)** (0.032) (0.017)***
F-Stat (First Stage) 41.93 18.95 24.89 21.66
Observations 8,602 8,602 6,631 6,631
Males
OLS -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
2SLS -0.048 -0.054 -0.062 -0.064
(0.029)* (0.029)* (0.029)** (0.034)*
ITT -0.016 -0.018 -0.020 -0.020
(0.009)* (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.010)**
First Stage 0.323 0.318 0.313 0.298
(0.076)*** (0.078)*** (0.079)*** (0.082)***
IV-Probit -0.047 -0.051 -0.056 -0.057
(0.024)** (0.022)** (0.019)*** (0.022)***
F-Stat (First Stage) 17.87 16.62 15.66 13.07
Observations 7,358 7,358 5,663 5,663
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level.
Table 7: Health-Education Gradient - IV and ADS compared
ADS-model
IV-estimate All countries IV-sample
Females -0.040 -0.026 -0.028
(0.024)* (0.005)*** (0.007)***
Males -0.048 -0.010 -0.020
(0.029)* (0.005)* (0.008)**
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and
10-percent level.
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Table 8: Robustness - ADS Model
ADS year panel ADS w/o ENG ADS l-exp, w/o GRC
Red form Dynamic HE Red form Dynamic HE Red form Dynamic HE
Females
education -0.025 -0.011 -0.023 -0.016 -0.03 -0.018
(0.006)*** (0.007) (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
self-rep poor healtht−1 0.307 0.240 0.252
(0.063)*** (0.046)*** (0.052)***
drinkingt−1 0.017 -0.017 -0.031
(0.069) (0.052) (0.056)
smokingt−1 -0.080 -0.043 -0.031
(0.076) (0.056) (0.063)
No vigorous -0.016 0.021 0.036
exerciset−1 (0.057) (0.044) (0.045)
BMIt−1 0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
incomet -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)* (0.002)*
Males
education -0.006 0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -0.010 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)* (0.006)
self-rep poor healtht−1 0.301 0.319 0.295
(0.060)*** (0.046)*** (0.051)***
drinkingt−1 -0.011 0.078 -0.067
(0.051) (0.038)** (0.042)
smokingt−1 0.001 -0.038 0.038
(0.056) (0.042) (0.049)
No vigorous 0.076 0.090 0.077
exerciset−1 (0.054) (0.043)** (0.044)*
BMIt−1 0.005 0.014 0.011
(0.007) (0.006)** (0.006)**
incomet -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Early life
few books in HH 0.024 -0.006 0.050 0.051 0.085 0.076
(0.048) (0.047) (0.035) (0.034) (0.038)** (0.036)**
serious diseases at 15 0.110 0.070 0.021 0.007 0.021 -0.006
(0.051)** (0.050) (0.037) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037)
poor health at 10 0.185 0.170 0.137 0.109 0.164 0.146
(0.073)** (0.070)** (0.053)*** (0.050)** (0.053)*** (0.051)***
hospital at 10 -0.078 -0.028 0.060 0.097 -0.009 0.016
(0.093) (0.091) (0.065) (0.062) (0.065) (0.062)
Principal components
parents drink or have -0.015 0.010 0.029 0.043 -0.009 0.011
mental problems at 10 (0.054) (0.053) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040)
parental absence at 10 0.047 0.029 -0.022 -0.016 0.009 0.005
(0.056) (0.054) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.039)
poor housing at 10 0.039 0.029 0.022 0.010 0.014 0.004
(0.023)* (0.022) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Life-expectancy
females 0.007 0.009
(0.005) (0.005)*
males 0.005 0.007
(0.003) (0.004)*
Observations 389 387 701 701 640 638
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level.
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Table 9: Number of Chronic Diseases
ADS ADS IV
Reduced form Dynamic HE Sample 10, lin-trend
Females
education -0.057 (0.015)∗∗∗ -0.024 (0.016) -0.157 (0.091)∗
# chronic deseasest−1 0.413 (0.044)∗∗∗
drinkingt−1 -0.044 (0.161)
smokingt−1 0.007 (0.178)
no vigorous exerciset−1 0.279 (0.131)∗∗∗
BMIt−1 0.012 (0.305)
incomet -0.002 (0.004)
Males
education 0.012 (0.017) -0.006 (0.016) 0.080 (0.066)
# chronic deseasest−1 0.337 (0.046)∗∗∗
drinkingt−1 -0.089 (0.116)
smokeingt−1 0.045 (0.147)
no vigorous exerciset−1 0.220 (0.198)
BMIt−1 0.041 (0.016)∗
incomet -0.004 (0.005)
Early Life
few books in HH -0.135 (0.110) -0.133 (0.102)
serious diseases at 15 0.067 (0.114) 0.084 (0.106)
poor health at 10 0.084 (0.164) -0.004 (0.151)
hospital at 10 0.081 (0.200) 0.112 (0.186)
Principal components
parents drink or have mental prbs 0.149 (0.124) 0.124 (0.117)
parental absence at 10 -0.128 (0.123) -0.112 (0.114)
poor housing at 10 0.069 (0.054) 0.037 (0.050)
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A Synthetic Indicators for Parental Background
We have built synthetic indicators for parental background variables in order to reduce
the dimensionality of the vector of controls by extracting the first principal component
from several group of indicators. Since most indicators are discrete we use the poly-
choric or polyserial correlation matrix instead of the usual correlation matrix as the
starting point of the principal component analysis. The polychoric correlation matrix
is a maximum likelihood estimate of the correlation between ordinal variables which
uses the assumption that ordinal variables are observed indicators of latent and nor-
mally distributed variables. The polyserial correlation matrix is defined in a similar
manner when one of the indicator is ordinal and the others are continuous. We list
below the synthetic indicators, the observed variables used for each indicator and the
interpretation we propose, based on the sign of the scoring coefficients. The scoring
coefficients are the same across males and females (otherwise, we argue, results would
not be comparable and we could not proceed with the aggregation-differentiation strat-
egy).
Housing at 10 based on the number of rooms in the house at age 10 and facilities
in the house (hot water) at age 10. The extracted first principal component
decreases as the number of rooms in the house (where the individual lived at age
10) increases and if there was no hot water: we interpret this indicator as poor
housing conditions at age 10 ;
Parental background at 10 based on binary indicators of whether parents drunk
or had mental problems when the individual was aged 10. Since the extracted
principal component increases if parents drunk or had mental problems, we in-
terpret it as poor parental background at age 10 ;
Parental absence/presence at 10 based on three binary indicators: whether the
mother died early, whether the father died early and whether the mother and the
father where present when the individual was aged 10. The extracted principal
component increases if any parent died early and decreases when parents where
present at age 10. We interpret this indicator as poor care at young age.
Descriptive statistics on the background variables used to build the synthetic indi-
cators and the additional background variables used in the baseline specification are
reported in Table A-1.
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Table A-1: Descriptive statistics, baseline estimation sample (micro-data), males (M)
and females (F).
Country Few books Serious Poor Health Hospital No hot water Rooms
at 10 dis. at 15 at 10 at 10 at 10 at 10
M F M F M F M F M F M F
Austria 0.42 0.48 0.33 0.32 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.37 0.37 3.3 3.1
Belgium 0.49 0.46 0.27 0.28 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.30 0.33 5.1 5.2
Denmark 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.14 4.4 4.3
England 0.30 0.24 0.36 0.31 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.21 2.9 3.0
France 0.47 0.48 0.29 0.28 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.24 0.26 4.3 4.0
Germany 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 3.9 4.0
Greece 0.64 0.64 0.21 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.38 0.33 2.7 2.8
Italy 0.79 0.75 0.16 0.21 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.47 0.45 3.1 2.9
Netherlands 0.35 0.30 0.23 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.04 4.7 4.6
Spain 0.66 0.65 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.46 0.44 3.6 3.5
Sweden 0.20 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.13 3.7 3.6
Switzerland 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.05 4.8 4.9
All 0.43 0.41 0.27 F 0.08 F 0.07 0.07 0.21 0.21 3.7 3.7
Country Parents Parents Moth/Fath Mother Father
drunk at 10 ment. prob. at 10 present at 10 died early died early
M F M F M F M F M F
Austria 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.80 0.71 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Belgium 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.92 0.92 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Denmark 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.89 0.90 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
England 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.89 0.89 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.01
France 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.90 0.86 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Germany 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.79 0.84 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Greece 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.97 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Italy 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.92 0.93 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Netherlands 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.92 0.92 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Spain 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.87 0.88 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sweden 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.87 0.88 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Switzerland 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.91 0.94 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.90 0.90 0.0 0.0 0.01 0.0
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B Educational Reforms in Europe
In this section, we briefly describe the compulsory schooling reforms we are using in
this study. The choice of reforms differs somewhat from Brunello, Fabbri and Fort
(2009) and Brunello, Fort and Weber (2009) because the individuals in our data are
aged 50 or older at the time of the interviews in 2004/2006. Therefore, we need to
focus only on relatively early reforms. For further details on educational reforms in
Europe see Fort (2006).
Austria In 1962 a federal act was passed that increased compulsory schooling from
8 to 9 years. The law came into effect on September 1, 1966. Pupils who were 14
years old (or younger) at that time had to attend school for an additional year. Since
compulsory education starts at the age of 6 and the cut-off date for school-entry is
September 1, (mostly) individuals born between September and December 1951 were
the first ones affected by the reform. Thus, the pivotal cohort is 1951.
Czech Republic In the 20th century, compulsory education was reformed several
times. In 1948 compulsory schooling was increased from 8 to 9 years (age 6 to 15). It
was reduced to 8 in 1953 and increased to 9 again in 1960. Two further changes took
place in 1979 and 1990. We consider all three reforms for our analysis. The pivotal
cohorts are 1934 (for the first reform), 1939 (for the second) and 1947 for the reform
in 1960. See Garrouste (2010) for more information on compulsory schooling reforms
in the Czech Republic.
Denmark In 1958 compulsory education was increased by 3 years, from 4 to 7. In
1971 compulsory schooling was further increased by 2 years, from 7 to 9. Education
started at age 7, thus pupils who were 11 years old (or younger) in 1958 were poten-
tially affected by the first reform, i.e. children born in 1947 and after. Since our data
only cover individuals 50+ in 2004/2006, we only consider the first reform for this
study.
England Two major compulsory schooling reforms were implemented in the UK in
1947 and 1973. The first reform increased the minimum school leaving age from 14
to 15, the second reform from 15 to 16. Since the school-entry age is 5 in the UK,
compulsory schooling was increased from 9 to 10 years in 1947 and from 10 to 11
years in 1973. Pupils who were 14 years old (or younger) in 1947 were affected by the
first reform, i.e. cohorts born in 1933 and after. Due to the sampling frame of ELSA
(individuals 50+), we only consider the first reform in this study.
France Two education reforms were implemented in France. In 1936, compulsory
schooling was increased from 7 to 8 years (age 13 to 14) and in 1959 from 8 to 10 years
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(age 14 to 16). After a long transition period, the second reform came into effect in
1967. The first reform affected pupils born 1923 (and after) and the second reform
pupils born 1953 (and after).
Italy In 1963 junior high school became mandatory in Italy and compulsory years of
schooling increased by 3 years (from 5 to 8 years). The first cohort potentially affected
by this reform is the cohort born in 1949.
Netherlands The Netherlands experienced many changes in compulsory education
in the last century. In this paper, we consider three education reforms: in 1942, in
1947 and in 1950. With the first reform compulsory schooling was increased from 7
to 8 years, with the second reform it fell back to 7 years and with the last reform it
increased again by 2 years, from 7 to 9. Accordingly, we choose the cohorts born in
1929, 1933 and 1936 as pivotal cohorts.
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